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The Value Relevance of Board Gender Diversity for NZX Listed Firms and 




Our study examines the relationship between board gender diversity and firm value and, in 
particular, whether the value relevance of female directors is affected by the level of growth 
options relative to assets-in-place. Using a sample of 865 firm-years covered by 125 firms 
listed on the New Zealand Exchange during the period 1998-2007, we found that board 
gender diversity is value enhancing when applying linear modelling. This relationship is 
strongest for firms with high levels of growth options. We also explore the possibility that the 
relationship between board gender diversity and firm value is non-linear. This analysis 
supports the existence of a concave non-linear relationship with the turning point being the 
appointment of one female director. This suggests that in New Zealand the benefit gained 
from board gender diversity can be captured with the appointment of one female director. 
Given the current overseas regulatory developments promoting the appointment of female 






The board of directors is an essential corporate governance mechanism (Gillan, 2006). Fama 
and Jensen (1983) characterise boards’ responsibilities as including both the ratification of 
management decisions and the monitoring of management performance. In addition, the 
board of directors has the power to hire, fire and compensate the senior management team. 
According to agency theory, the board’s responsibility for monitoring managers’ actions 
ensures that such actions are aligned with shareholders’ interests and operates to mitigate 
managerial opportunism (Fama and Jensen, 1983). These fundamental roles of the board of 
directors, as a critical component of a good corporate governance system, have given rise to a 
great deal of research investigating the value relevance of the board of directors. 
Despite this rich literature, there has been little research that examines the relationship 
between board structure and firm value and the extent to which the level of growth options 
relative to assets-in-place affects this relationship. Within this limited literature, the research 
studies have only focused on the number of independent directors on the board and board size 
as indicators of board structure (Matolcsy et al., 2004; Orr et al., 2005). In addition, these 
studies have utilised only cross-sectional data sets. Using a sample of 306 firms listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange drawn from the UTS Accenture “Who Governs Australia” 
database for the year 2001, Matolcsy et al. (2004) found that the market value of firms, with 
larger investments in growth options, increases with having more outside directors. Another 
research study by Orr et al. (2005) was based on a sample of 60 randomly selected firms 
listed on the New Zealand Exchange (NZX) during 2001. This study documents that firms 
with high level of growth options were more likely to have a higher proportion of outside 
directors on the board than those with a low level of growth options. This in turn had a 
positive effect on the relationship between board independence and firm value. 
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More recently, researchers have investigated the impact of gender diversity on board 
effectiveness (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Their research findings include suggestions that 
women bring different perspectives to board decision-making; that a more diverse board 
promotes greater understanding of the market, and that female directors increase the linkage 
or networking opportunities. Our study extends the prior research by investigating whether 
the value enhancement of board gender diversity varies depending on the level of growth 
options relative to assets-in-place. We also explore whether the relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm value may be non-linear. If there is a non-linear relationship 
between board gender diversity and firm value, then pressures to increase the number of 
female directors on boards to very high levels may be misguided. 
The study is based on a longitudinal sample of 125 firms listed on the NZX, which covers 
865 firm-years with financial reporting periods ending between 31 January 1998 and 31 
December 2007. Other indicators of board structure, namely the proportion of non-executive 
directors and the size of the board, which were examined in prior research studies, are used as 
control variables.We also employ a simultaneous equations method in our analysis to address 
the potential endogeneity problem between board gender diversity and firm value. Our results 
provide strong evidence that board gender diversity is value enhancing when applying linear 
modelling. This relationship is strongest for firms with high levels of growth options. Our 
application of a non-linear model confirms the existence of a concave non-linear relationship 
with the turning point being the appointment of one female director. 
Our study makes a number of novel contributions to the literature. First, our study analyses 
the impact on firm value of board gender diversity and its association with the level of growth 
options relative to assets-in-place. Second, our study explores the possibility that the 
relationship between board gender diversity and firm value is non-linear. Third, our study is 
 3 
 
based on a longitudinal data set, which provides more generalisable results than those 
documented in prior research studies, which only focus on a cross-sectional data sample. 
Fourth, we employ a simultaneous equations framework to control for the potential 
endogeneity problem between board gender diversity and firm value. 
A key motivation for our study is to investigate the economic value of women on boards in 
light of recent international developments. Most notably, the ASX amended its Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations from 1 January 2011 to require listed 
companies to publish a policy concerning diversity and to annually disclose progress towards 
gender diversity in the firm generally and on the board. In the United Kingdom, the Davies 
Report, which was released in February 2011, recommended that Chairs of all FTSE 
companies should set out the percentages of women they aspire to have appointed to their 
boards in 2013 and 2015. Furthermore, the Report recommended that all FTSE 100 
companies should appoint a minimum of 25 percent of women directors by 2015. It also 
recommended that the UK Corporate Governance Code, published by the Financial Reporting 
Council, should be amended to require listed companies to establish a policy concerning 
boardroom diversity and be required to report against this policy. 
These initiatives are the latest in a series of international reforms and recommendations 
around the world to increase the number of women on boards. The “most extreme promotion 
of gender diversity occurs in Norway” (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). From 1 January 2008, all 
publicly held firms were required to have at least 40 percent women directors by 2008 or be 
confronted with dissolution. Other European jurisdictions, such as Spain, the Netherlands and 
France have passed similar quota law and other European countries have also initiated 
reforms in this area (Ahern and Dittmar, 2010; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2010). 
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New Zealand provides a useful context in which to explore the value relevance of board 
gender diversity because to date there has not been any explicit regulatory initiatives to 
increase the number of women to boards. 1  In such an environment, women would be 
appointed to boards based on their expected positive contribution rather than as a response to 
external pressure to make token appointments of women. This environment provides an 
experimental setting which enables us to identify the value relevance of board gender 
diversity in the absence of external influences. 
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the relevant 
literature on board gender diversity, firm value and growth options and develops the research 
hypotheses. An overview of the research design is provided in section 3. Section 4 sets out 
our results and we present our conclusions in section 5. 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 The Benefits of Board Gender Diversity 
The board of directors, with its dual responsibilities of ratifying decisions and monitoring 
management, underpinned by its fiduciary obligations to the company, is an important 
corporate governance mechanism (Gillan, 2006). From an agency theory perspective, the 
board’s monitoring role operates to protect shareholders from the self-interest of 
management, thereby mitigating agency costs associated with moral hazard. Accordingly, the 
better a board is able to monitor management, the more agency costs will be reduced and 
accordingly, firm value increases. 
Pressure to increase the number of women on boards is based “on the view that the presence 
of women on boards could affect the governance of companies in significant ways” (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009). Historically much of the literature on women on corporate boards can be 
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found in the management, psychology or sociology fields focusing at a theoretical level on 
why, both at an individual and firm level, women are under-represented on corporate boards 
(Terjesen et al., 2009). Within the finance and economic literature, researchers have begun to 
investigate the economic value of board diversity in general. Cox and Blake (1991) argue that 
firms that deal with diversity-related issues should have economic advantages over firms that 
do not. In fact, according to Keys et al. (2002), firms ranked by Fortune as being among the 
“diversity elite” added more value to their shareholders compared to non-diversity promoters. 
Within this debate on the value of diversity in general, there are an increasing number of 
research studies on the economic impact of gender diversity on a board. Research within this 
business case paradigm as distinct from what can be loosely described as ethical approaches 
can be divided into two broad categories. First, research which has analysed the influence of 
female directors on boardroom dynamics and second, research which has considered the 
impact of gender diversity on firms’ financial and market performance. 
Board room dynamics arguments are based on a belief that diversity in general, and board 
gender diversity in particular, promotes a better understanding of the marketplace, increases 
creativity and innovation as well as enhancing the effectiveness of corporate leadership 
(Robinson and Dechant, 1997). There are a significant number of largely intuitive, theoretical 
frameworks underlying research as to the benefits of board diversity in general and women 
on boards specifically. A recent review of research in this area divided the literature into 
research that has considered the characteristics and impact of female directors at an 
individual level, at a board level and on the firm generally (Terjesen et al., 2009). For 
example at a board level, social capital theorists contend that more women on a board will 
create a more diverse board and a more diverse board will intuitively provide a wider range 
of perspectives, thereby ensuring that a board will make better decisions (van der Walt and 
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Ingley, 2003). At a firm level, resource dependence theorists contend that as boards also 
provide linking functions between a company and the external world, a more diverse board, 
including a higher percentage of women directors, will provide a greater range of network 
and linkage opportunities for a firm (Hillman et al., 2002). In an empirical study, Brammer et 
al. (2007) found that board composition in the United Kingdom varied across industry sectors 
with the highest rate of female directors found in the retailing, banking, media and utilities. 
These sectors all have a closer proximity to final consumers. This proximity was found to 
have a positive effect on shaping board diversity. In contrast, sectors such as resources, 
engineering and business, which were characterised as being isolated from final consumers 
and having largely a male workforce, have fewer female directors. 
In terms of firm financial and market performance, although there have been a number of 
empirical research studies that have studied the relationship between board gender diversity 
and firm performance, the results of these studies have been inconclusive (Carter et al., 2003; 
Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2010; Carter et al., 2010). Carter et 
al. (2003) found significant positive relationships between the percentage of women or 
minorities on the board and firm value after effectively controlling for size, industry and 
other corporate governance measures. More recently, Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2010) 
found that female board appointments are positively associated with firm value over a 
sustained period. This research is based on the short and long-term effect of the appointment 
of female directors prior to the decision by the Spanish government to regulate for an 
increase in the number of women on boards. 
However, the most recent study by Carter et al. (2010), after summarising seven prior 
research studies which had investigated the link between board gender diversity and firm 
performance, concluded that the findings are inconclusive. In their own research of a sample 
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of firms from the S&P 500 index for the five-year period from 1998 to 2002, Carter et al. 
(2010) found no effect, either positive or negative, of board gender and ethnic diversity on 
the financial performance of the firm. One of the research studies reviewed by Carter et al. 
(2010) was that of Adams and Ferreira (2009) who had found a negative relationship between 
gender diversity and both ROA and Tobin’s Q using a sample of firms from 1996 to 2003. 
Interestingly, they found that female directors attended more board meetings than male 
directors and were more likely to join monitoring committees such as audit, compensation, 
nominating and corporate governance, which led them to conclude that gender diverse boards 
allocate more effort to monitoring. However, they argue that over monitoring can decrease 
shareholder value and concluded that while firms with weak governance, as measured by an 
ability to resist a takeover, may benefit from board gender diversity, overall the impact was 
negative. 
In a study of Norwegian companies by Ahern and Dittmar (2010), following the 2003 quota 
of 40 percent female directors on Norwegian Boards, it was found that this event resulted in a 
substantial change in the characteristics of board members, including age, gender and 
experience, and had a significantly negative impact on firm value. However, Ahern and 
Dittmar (2010) suggested that this loss was not caused by the gender of the new directors, but 
rather by the loss of older, experienced male directors. 
2.2 Board Gender Diversity and Firm Value 
Where an agency problem or conflict of interests exists among stakeholders of a firm, 
corporate governance in general, and board structure in particular, are important. Carter et al. 
(2003) suggest that agency theory is the “theoretical framework most often used by 
investigators in finance and economics to understand the link between board characteristics 
and firm value”. An effective corporate board ameliorates agency costs arising from the 
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separation of ownership and control, information asymmetry and contracting costs (Hart, 
1995) and where such agency problems cannot be satisfactorily contracted away due to 
significant uncertainty. According to Bushman and Smith (2003), effective corporate 
governances mechanisms, such as corporate boards, serve two important purposes. First, they 
ensure that minority shareholders receive reliable information about the value of firms and 
that a company’s managers and large shareholders do not cheat them out of the value of their 
investments. Second, they motivate managers to maximise firm value instead of pursuing 
personal objectives. 
From a traditional agency theory viewpoint, effective corporate boards require the presence 
of non-executive and independent directors on a board. Outside directors on a board add 
value for shareholders if they actively monitor and challenge the insider directors and reduce 
the opportunity for self-dealing by the executive directors. Outside directors do not add value 
simply because they are independent of the company of which they are directors. According 
to Carter et al. (2003), this raises the central question as to the relationship between board 
diversity and board independence. One argument they put forward is that diversity increases 
board independence because people with a different gender, ethnicity or cultural values can 
be considered as the ‘ultimate outsider’. A more diverse board encompassing both executive 
and non-executive directors may be a more activist board and ask different questions than 
directors with more orthodox backgrounds. 
The most commonly studied aspect of board composition has been the ratio of outside 
directors to executive directors on a board and the relationship to firm value (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). These research studies focusing on the ratio of outside directors as a proxy 
for the level of board activism have relevance; however, a more diverse board is likely to be a 
more activist board. Carter et al. (2003) argue that although the theoretical framework does 
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not determine the role of board diversity in firm value in the corporate world, there appears to 
be an intuitive belief in a positive relationship between board diversity and firm value. 
However, they point out that board diversity may not result in more effective monitoring if 
diverse board members are marginalised. We therefore propose the following hypotheses 
regarding the influence of board gender diversity on firm value: 
H01: Board gender diversity has no impact on firm value. 
HA1: Board gender diversity does have an impact on firm value. 
2.3 The Influence of Board Gender Diversity on Firm Value and its Association with 
Growth Options 
A firm’s value is a function of its expected future cash flows, discounted for risk and time. 
Cash flows can be generated from assets-in-place and from the realisation of growth options. 
Assets-in-place represent the firm’s investments in real or physical assets while growth 
options represent the  value of the opportunity for future investments in assets (Orr et al., 
2005). 
Compared to assets-in-place, growth options are more firm-specific and are more difficult to 
trade on secondary markets as their value is mostly determined jointly by other assets held by 
the firm (Matolcsy et al., 2004). The nature of investments in growth options increases the 
need to monitor management (Smith and Watts, 1992; Skinner, 1993), because of concerns 
that management may use their discretion to make decisions that are in their self interest and 
do not maximise firm value for shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This need is 
exacerbated when the proportion of a firm’s growth options to assets-in-place increases. In 
order to mitigate this problem, the firm can introduce measures to more effectively monitor 
management. Extant literature indicates that female directors proffer greater monitoring and 
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oversight of managers’ decision-making and performance (Erhardt et al., 2003; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). Female directors have higher rates of board attendance, and comparative 
higher level of participation in corporate governance, audit and other committees, activities 
that enhance the ability of the board to more effectively monitor management. Female 
directors are also more likely to require higher standards of proof or substantiation of 
managers’ narratives and accounts, thereby increasing transparency and the quality of board 
decision-making. Studies have shown that diverse groups, such as a diverse board, exhibit 
increased information search and a greater range of perspectives (Hillman et al., 2007) 
Accordingly, studies have indicated that firms with a more diverse board, reduce the 
opportunities for management to act opportunistically and provide more experience and 
knowledge to ensure that growth options are exercised optimally. 
Despite the prevalence of views regarding the potential value enhancement provided by 
female directors for high growth firms, the lack of a strong foundation for these views prompt 
us to present the following hypotheses regarding the impact of growth options on the 
relationship between board gender diversity and firm value: 
H02: Board gender diversity has no impact on firm value regardless of the level 
of a firm’s growth options. 
HA2: Board gender diversity does have an impact on firm value depending on the 
level of a firm’s growth options. 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Study Period and Sample 
The sample selection process commences with the 317 firms listed in the Events section of 
the NZX database as at 17 September 2008. After elimination  of 113 firms for which data is 
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not available in the NZX database, 31 firms which are listed on the New Zealand Alternative 
Market (NZAX) and 48 firms that have not issued at least 5 annual reports since being listed 
on the NZSX2, the final sample comprises 125 firms. These 125 firms cover a total of 897 
firm-years with financial reporting periods ending between 31 January 1998 and 31 
December 2007.3 After deleting 17 firm-years with negative book value of equity4 and 15 
firm-years with missing board structure indicators, the total firm-years in the final sample is 
865. 
Details about this sample selection process are provided in Table 1 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.2 Data Sources 
The NZX listing status was extracted from the Events section of the NZX database as at 17 
September 2008. Data related to board structure was hand collected from the annual reports 
which are provided in the Annual Reports section of the NZX database. Accounting and 
market-related data was obtained from either the NZX database or the Datastream database. 
3.3 Hypothesis Testing Procedures 
To test the relationship between board gender diversity and firm value and the extent to 
which this relationship is affected by the level of growth options, we employ the Collins et 
al.'s (1997) version of the Ohlson's (1995) model to estimate the following regression 
equation: 
MVE = a0 + a1BVE + a2NPAT + a3BRDDIVERSITY + a4GROWTH + 




MVE = market value of equity per share basis at the end of the 
current financial year 
BVE = book value of equity per share basis at the end of the 
current financial year 
NPAT = earnings per share at the end of the current financial year 
BRDDIVERSITY = the percentage of female directors on the board 
GROWTH = the natural logarithm of the market to book value of equity 
at the end of the current financial year. 
BRDDIVERSITY_GROWTH = BRDDIVERSITY multiplied by GROWTH 
X6 (LEVERAGE) = the natural logarithm of book value of total liabilities 
divided by book value of total equity at the end of the 
current financial year 
X7(BRDINDP) = the percentage of non-executive directors on the board 
X8(BRDSIZE) = the number of directors on the board 
 
Leverage is included to control for the effect that capital structure could have on equity value 
(Orr et al., 2005). Also, numerous research studies suggest that leverage could confound the 
value relevance of outside directors (Jensen, 1986, 1989; Anderson et al., 1993; Gul and Tsui, 
1998). 
Many research studies have considered whether the proportion of independent directors and 
the size of the board enhance the board’s ability to operate as an effective corporate 
governance mechanism (John and Senbet, 1998; Carter et al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that a larger proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board enhance board monitoring performance. According to Chen and Jaggi (2000), firms 
with a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the board were more engaged and 
provided more comprehensive statutory disclosures. Firms with a higher level of board 
independence were less likely to engage in earnings management (Klein, 2002). In addition, 
Matolcsy et al. (2004) and Orr et al. (2005) both document that firms with more outside 
directors on the board have higher firm value, especially in the presence of high level of 
growth options relative to assets-in-place.  
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Board size is argued to enhance board monitoring performance, as appointing more directors 
on the board would enhance board knowledge and provide greater capacity to share the 
monitoring responsibilities (Song and Windram, 2004; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
However, larger boards are posited to be less flexible and less efficient due to higher 
coordination costs and less effective communication (John and Senbet, 1998; Coles et al., 
2008). According to Bradbury et al. (2006), firms with a greater number of directors on the 
board tended to have high earnings quality. However, Yermack (1996) documents a negative 
relationship between board size and firm value. Given that most NZX listed firms are 
relatively small, the first effect could reasonably be argued to dominate the second. Also, 
prior studies by Matolcsy et al. (2004) and Orr et al. (2005) control for board size when 
examining the impact of board independence on firm value and its association with growth 
options. 
The variable of interest in testing H1 is BRDDIVERISTY. A significant coefficient on this 
variable will reject H01. A positive (negative) significant coefficient would suggest that firm 
value is enhanced (reduced) by the presence of female directors on boards. For H2, the 
variable of interest is the interaction variable between BRDDIVERISTY and GROWTH. 
Again, a significant coefficient on this variable will reject H02. A positive (negative) 
significant coefficient would confirm that firm value is more enhanced by the presence of 
women on boards among firms with high (low) growth options. 
We also explore the possibility that the relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
value is non-linear by estimating the following regression equation: 
MVE = a0 + a1BVE + a2NPAT + a3.1BRDDIVERSITY + a3.2BRDDIVERSITY^2 + 
a4GROWTH + a5BRDDIVERSITY_GROWTH + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑋𝑖8𝑖=6  + ε  (1b) 
 14 
 
A significant coefficient on the variable BRDDIVERSITY^2 would confirm the non-linear 
relationship between board gender diversity and firm value. 
According to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), board structure characteristics including board 
gender diversity and firm attributes including firm value could be endogenously determined. 
If this is the case, the estimation of the equations (1a) and (1b) could produce biased 
coefficient estimates. In order to address the concern about the possible endogenous 
relationship between board gender diversity and firm value and thus detect a one-way causal 
effect of board gender diversity on firm value, a two-stage least squares estimation is 
employed by adding the following regression equation: 
BRDDIVERSITY = b0 + b1MVE + ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑌𝑖5𝑖=2   + ɣ    (2) 
FIRMAGE = the natural logarithm of the number of days a firm has been listed on the 
NZX 
ROA = net earnings after tax divided by total assets at the end of the financial year  
EPSVOL = the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of earnings per share 
changes in the previous four years 
CROSSLIST = a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a 
foreign exchange 
 
The age of the firm is included to control for potential alternative explanations for female 
representation on the board, such as inertia (Hillman et al., 2002). We also include return on 
assets and earnings volatility as previous research suggests that firm performance is 
associated with female board participation (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). Finally, given the recent international developments in promoting more 
female directors on boards while in New Zealand there has not been any explicit regulatory 




Using two-stage least squares estimation, in the first stage, board gender diversity is 
regressed on all the exogenous variables including book value of equity per share, earnings 
per share, growth, leverage, board independence, board size, firm age, return on assets, 
earnings volatility and cross-listing status; and the fitted values of board gender diversity are 
obtained. In the second stage, the fitted values of board gender diversity replace the original 
board gender diversity in equations (1a) and (1b) to test the impact of board gender diversity 
on firm value and its association with growth options as well as investigate the possible non-
linear relationship between board gender diversity and firm value. 
Prior to estimating the model, the skewness and kurtosis statistics are checked for all 
continuous variables and extreme values are winsorised to preserve the characteristics of the 
original data while minimising the possible distortion of results by these extreme values. The 
maximum number of observations winsorised is low at the level of five percent of the sample 
observations. 
4 Results 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. The 
mean of the market value of equity per share, book value of equity per share and earnings per 
share is $2.388, $1.481 and $0.109, respectively. The percentage of female directors and non-
executive directors is 5.2 and 82.1 percent, respectively. The percentage of non-executive 
directors is far higher than the 66.5 percent for ASX listed firms documented in Matolcsy et 
al. (2004). The average board size is 6.1, which is similar to that of 6.6 for ASX listed firms. 
The mean of market to book value of equity is 3.096, which is slighty higher than the mean of 
2.883 among ASX-listed firms provided in Matolcsy et al. (2004). The average leverage is 
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relatively high at 1.850 compared to the average of 1.246 for ASX listed firms reported in 
Matolcsy et al. (2004). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
To facilitate the analysis of our hypotheses, we first divide the 865 firm-years in the entire 
sample into a low growth options group and a high growth options group based on the 
median of the variable GROWTH. Untabulated descriptive statistics for the GROWTH 
variable of these two groups are as follows: (1) for the 432 firm-years in the low growth 
options group, the mean, median and standard deviation of GROWTH are -0.189, -0.088 and 
0.413, respectively; and (2) for the 433 firm-years in the high growth options group, the 
mean, median and standard deviation of GROWTH are 1.084, 0.935 and 0.587, respectively. 
The value of growth options for the high growth options group is significantly larger for that 
reported for the low growth options group at the 1 percent level using both two-tailed t-test (t-
statistic = 36.877 and p-value = 0.000) and Mann-Whitney z-test (z-statistic = 25.456 and p-
value = 0.000). 
Table 3 compares the dependent and independent variables (except for GROWTH) for low 
and high growth options groups. It is obvious from Table 3 that the mean MVE for firms with 
high growth options ($3.134) is significantly higher than that for firms with low growth 
options ($1.641) at the 1 percent level. It is interesting to observe that the mean BVE for firms 
with high growth options ($1.190) is significantly lower than the mean BE  for firms with low 
growth options ($1.772) at the 1 percent level. The mean NPAT for high growth options 
group ($0.137) is far higher than that of low options group ($0.081) and the difference 
between the two groups is significant at the 1 percent level. The mean percentage of female 
directors on board for firms with high growth options is 5.8 percent compared to only 4.6 
percent documented for firms with low growth options. This difference is significant at 1 
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percent level. The mean LEVERAGE for firms with low growth options is -0.719, which is 
significantly lower than the -0.124 reported for the high growth options group. The 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board among firms with high growth options is 
significantly lower than that among firms with low growth options. Board size is 
quantitatively similar across the two groups. 
Further results in Table 3 reveal that firms with low growth options have been listed on the 
NZX longer, have higher return on assets, and are less likely to be cross-listed on a foreign 
exchange compared to those with high growth options. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The regression results of testing our two hypotheses are presented in Table 4. The coefficient 
estimate on BRDDIVERSITY is 7.764 and is significant at the 1 percent level, which rejects 
H01. Firms with a higher percentage of female directors on the board are associated with 
higher market value of equity. 
The coefficient estimate on BRDDIVERSITY_GROWTH is significantly positive at 1 percent 
level (13.270). Therefore, H02 is rejected. The value of board gender diversity appears to be 
more apparent among firms with high growth options. 
Other results in Table 4 show that the coefficient estimates on BVE, NPAT, GROWTH and 
LEVERAGE are all positive and are significant at the 1 percent level. Firms with larger board 
are more likely to have higher firm value. In addition, the regression estimated has high 
explanatory power, as determined by the adjusted R2 of 0.803 and the F-statistic of 441.990, 
which is significant at the 1 percent level. The Durbin χ2 and the Wu-Hausman F-statistic are 
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both significant at 1 percent level, confirming the appropriateness of the two-stage least 
squares analysis. 
The coefficient estimate on BRDDIVERISTY is significant at 1 percent level (35.970) and the 
coefficient estimate on BRDDIVERISTY^2 is significantly negative at 1 percent level (-
251.485), which supports the existence of a concave non-linear relationship with the turning 
point being the appointment of one female director. This suggests that the benefit gained 
from board gender diversity can be captured by the appointment of one female director. The 
coefficient estimate on BRDDIVERSITY_GROWTH is still significantly positive at 1 percent 
level (15.328), which confirms that board gender diversity is more value relevant among 
firms with high growth options. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
First, White’s heteroscedasticity standard errors are used to allow the refitting of the models 
which may contain heteroscedastic residuals. The results obtained from retesting the models 
are quantitatively similar to the main findings. 
Second, we also test the models for each of the years of our sample. Given the relatively 
small size of the sample, this is a strongly demanding test. We find that the positive impact of 
board gender diversity on firm value is held for the year 2001 and the interaction effect 
between board gender diversity and growth options is held for all of the years. The concave 
non-linear relationship between board gender diversity and firm value is held for the years 
1999, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
Third, the models are tested for each of the six major industry groups: (1) materials, mining 
or energy, (2) technology, telecommunication or biotechnology, (3) financial services, (4) 
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utilities, airports, airlines, ports or shipping, (5) manufacturing or healthcare, and (6) 
consumer staples. Again, given the relatively small sample size, this is also a strongly 
demanding test. It is found that the positive impact of board gender diversity on firm value is 
only apparent for the materials, mining or energy group. The interaction effect is held for all 
industry groups except for the materials, mining or energy group and the utilities, airports, 
airlines, ports or shipping group. The concave non-linear relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm value is confirmed among the materials, mining or energy group and the 
consumer staples group. 
Fourth, the models are retested inclusive of each of the industry dichotomous variables for 
the six major industry groups. It is interesting to observe that only firms in the technology, 
telecommunication or biotechnology group are associated with lower market value of equity. 
The other results are not significantly different from the main findings. 
Fifth, the models are re-estimated including interaction variables between board 
independence and growth options (BRDINDP_GROWTH) and board size and growth options 
(BRDSIZE_GROWTH). The coefficients on BRDINDP_GROWTH and BRDSIZE_GROWTH 
are positive significant at 1 percent level, indicating that board independence and board size 
are more positively associated with firm value among firms with high growth options. The 
other results are not significantly different from the main findings. 
Lastly, following Ozer-Balli and Sorensen (2011), we test the robustness of our models with 
interaction variables by retesting the models with demeaned interaction variables. The results 
obtained from retesting the models with demeaned interaction variables are quantitatively 




The objective of our study is to examine the relationship between board gender diversity and 
firm value, and the extent to which the level of growth options relative to assets-in-place 
affects this relationship in New Zealand using both linear and non-linear models. Based on a 
sample of 865 firm-years covered by 125 firms listed on the NZX with financial reporting 
dates ending between 31 January 1998 and 31 December 2007, our results document 
significant evidence that board gender diversity together with the level of growth options 
significantly impact on firm value after effectively controlling for the endogeneity problem.  
Using a linear model, we find that firms with a higher number of female directors on the 
board have higher firm value. In addition, the benefit of board gender diversity appears to be 
more apparent among firms with high growth options. Our analysis employing a non-linear 
model provides evidence that the appointment of one female board member is value 
enhancing. This suggests that any benefit from the different perspectives brought to the board 
by female directors is captured with the appointment of one woman to the board. 
The findings with regard to board gender diversity have important implications for the 
ongoing policy and regulatory debate about the role of women on boards. Our findings on the 
value relevance of board gender diversity using a linear model are consistent with overseas 
research and with overseas regulatory developments promoting the percentage of female 
directors on the board. However, our results using a non-linear model suggest that there is an 
optimal level of participation by women on boards that captures the benefit of gender 
diversity. This raises questions about the promotion by regulators internationally of increased 
board gender diversity without consideration of whether there are limits to the benefits that 
accrue from appointing extra female board members. 
The major limitation of our study is that it focuses a small sample within a small jurisdiction 
of New Zealand; therefore, the generalisability of our findings is diminished. It is possible 
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that there are idiosyncratic characteristics in the New Zealand business culture that limit the 
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Sample Selection Procedure 
Selecting criteria Number of Observations 
Sample firms  
Total firms listed on the Events section of the NZX database as at 17 
September 2008 
317 
Less firms listed on the Events section of the NZX database not covered 
by the NZX database 
(113) 
Less firms listed on the NZAX (31) 
Less firms not issuing at least 5 annual reports since being listed on the 
NZSX 
(48) 
Total firms in the final sample 125 
Sample firm-years  
Total firm years for 125 firms 897 
Less firm-years with negative book value of equity (17) 
Less firm-years with missing board gender diversity data (15) 
Total firm-years in the final sample 865 
1 The total number of firm-years includes all firm-years with financial reporting dates ending between 31 








Variables Mean/Number Median/Percentage Standard Deviation 
MVE ($) 2.388 1.310 2.948 
BVE ($) 1.481 0.976 2.086 
NPAT ($) 0.109 0.080 0.478 
BRDDIVERSITY 0.052 0.000 0.106 
MVE/BVE 3.096 1.428 17.532 
GROWTH 0.449 0.356 0.814 
LEVERAGE -0.421 -0.274 1.327 
BRDINDP 0.821 0.833 0.184 
BRDSIZE 6.111 6 1.885 
FIRMAGE 8.383 8.341 0.757 
ROA 0.004 0.043 0.202 
EPSVOL -2.759 -2.696 1.451 
CROSSLIST 160 18.50%  







Univariate Comparison between Variables for Low and High Growth Option Firm-years 
 Low Growth Option 
N = 432 
High Growth Option 
N = 433 


















MVE ($) 1.641 0.900 2.435 3.134 2.241 3.218 7.695** (8.748**) 
BVE ($) 1.772 1.042 2.518 1.190 0.819 1.486 -4.136** (-4.468**) 
NPAT ($) 0.081 0.055 0.304 0.137 0.134 0.603 1.733* (6.105**) 
BRDDIVERSITY 0.046 0.000 0.113 0.058 0.000 0.098 1.763* (3.582**) 
LEVERAGE -0.719 -0.530 1.358 -0.124 -0.035 1.226 6.767** (6.632**) 
BRDINDP 0.827 0.857 0.194 0.814 0.833 0.173 -1.080 (-2.020*) 
BRDSIZE 6.058 6 1.844 6.164 6 1.927 0.827 (1.074) 
FIRMAGE 8.460 8.487 0.767 8.306 8.253 0.740 -3.009** (-2.888**) 
ROA 0.010 0.030 0.119 -0.002 0.068 0.260 -0.856 (7.179**) 
EPSVOL -2.735 -2.624 1.477 -2.782 -2.770 1.426 -0.475 (-1.069) 
CROSSLIST 65 15.05%  95 21.94%  6.817** 
^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). See Section 3 for 







Simultaneous Equations Analysis for the Value Relevance of Board Gender Diversity and its Association 
with Growth Options 
Variable First-stage 
Dep. Var. = BRDDIVERSITY 
Second-stage 
Dep. Var. = MVE 
Second-stage 

































































Durbin χ2 56.264** 
Wu-Hausman F-statistic 59.553** 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.803 0.809 
F-statistic 5.040** 441.990** 406.31** 
Number of observations 865 







                                                 
1 In New Zealand, the NZX’s Listing Rules set out a number of minimum requirements, including the minimum 
number of directors (Rule 3.1.1(a)), the minimum number of New Zealand resident directors (Rule 3.1.1(b)) and 
the rules to calculate the minimum number of independent directors. The New Zealand Securities Commission’s 
Corporate Governance in New Zealand – Principles and Guidelines’s Principle 2 provides that “there should be 
a balance of independence, skills, knowledge, experience, and perspectives among directors so that the board 
works effectively”. 
2 We delete firms that have not issued at least 5 annual reports since being listed on the NZSX in order to (i) 
ensure greater homogeneity in the age of firms and (ii) provide a reasonable basis for the measurement of 
earnings volatility as an instrument in the two-stage least squares estimation. 
3 Given the mixed financial reporting dates among NZX-listed firms, the final sample consists of firms with 31 
January, 28 February, 31 March, 31 May, 30 June, 31 July, 1 August, 31 August, 30 September or 31 December 
financial reporting dates. 
4 We delete firms with negative book values as these firms are likely to have been seriously distressed firms and 
the negative value is inconsistent with the book value of equity in the test regression equation being a measure 
of the expected value of normal earnings. 
